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The Flash Crash: An Examination of Shareholder Wealth and Market 
Quality 
 
Abstract 
We investigate stock returns, market quality, and options market activity around the flash crash 
of May 6, 2010. Abnormal returns are negative on the day of and the day after the flash crash for 
stocks that had trades that executed during the crash subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or 
NYSE Arca. Consistent with studies that suggest that other sources of liquidity withdrew from 
the markets during the flash crash, we find that the fraction of trades executed by the NYSE 
increases during this volatile period. Market quality deteriorates following the flash crash as bid-
ask spreads increase and quote depths decrease. Evidence from the options markets indicates that 
investor uncertainty increased around the time of the crash and remained elevated for several 
days afterwards. 
 
Running Head: The Flash Crash 
JEL classification: D02, G14, G28 
Keywords: Flash crash, event study, market quality 
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The Flash Crash: An Examination of Shareholder Wealth and Market Quality 
 
1. Introduction 
On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) opened at 10,862.30 and closed 
at 10,517.83. Not captured in this 3.2 percent loss are the specifics of one of the most tumultuous 
days in U.S. stock market history. Fig. 1, which reports the price performance of the SPDR Dow 
Jones Industrial Average ETF, illustrates the dramatic events of the day. After creeping slowly 
downward following the market‟s open, the DJIA began a rapid decline at around 2:30 p.m. that 
ultimately shaved nearly 1,000 points off of the index. However, the decline was short-lived as 
things quickly reversed course, leading to an equally rapid recovery. A number of individual 
stocks also experienced harrowing, but brief, price shocks. For example, shares of The Procter & 
Gamble Company, which traded at over $60/share at 2:40 p.m., fell to $39.37/share in 
approximately 3.5 minutes, only to bounce back above $60/share about a minute later. Of the 30 
DJIA components, 18 experienced price declines of at least 5 percent between 2:40 p.m. and 
2:50 p.m., and the remaining 12 fell by at least 2.3 percent. Due to their sudden and dramatic 
nature, the events of May 6, 2010 are often referred to as the „flash crash.‟ 
<<FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
Regulators, researchers, and other market participants continue to seek explanations for that 
day‟s events. Within two weeks of the flash crash, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) jointly issued a 
report that proposed a number of contributing factors, including the linkage between ETFs and 
E-mini S&P 500 futures and individual securities; mismatches in liquidity; disparate trading 
3 
conventions among various exchanges; stub quotes; and market and limit orders.
1
 The report 
places particular emphasis on the impact of an unusually large sell order in E-mini S&P 500 
futures contracts. Academic studies of the flash crash tend to focus on the role of high frequency 
traders. While stopping short of blaming high frequency traders directly, Easley et al. (2011) and 
Kirilenko et al. (2011) conclude that they did contribute to the extreme market volatility 
witnessed on the day of the crash. Lee et al. (2011) suggest that the flash crash resulted from 
systematic traders with similar trading strategies, while Yu (2011) finds evidence that contrarian 
trading strategies helped to mitigate the effects of the flash crash. 
We contribute to the search for answers by studying NYSE-listed stocks that had trades 
executed during the flash crash that were subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE 
Arca and a closely matched sample of stocks that did not experience cancelled trades. The focus 
of our analysis is fourfold. First, we examine stock returns around the flash crash. Second, we 
provide details on the allocation of trading volume across trading venues during this period of 
extreme volatility. Third, we examine market quality before, during, and after the flash crash, 
including measures of bid-ask spreads and quote depth. Fourth, for sample stocks with tradable 
options, we study changes to the sensitivity of option prices to quantifiable risk factors around 
the flash crash. 
We find that shareholder wealth declined significantly in the days surrounding the flash 
crash. The average cumulative abnormal return over the two days beginning on the day of the 
flash crash is –1.77 percent for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were 
                                                 
1
 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
“Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010”, report filed September 30, 2010. Available online at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. Henceforth referred to as CFTC-SEC (2010). 
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subsequently cancelled. During the flash crash, several of our sample stocks had trades execute 
at stub quotes (e.g., $0.01 or $100,000), which indicates that the limit order book was very thin, 
particularly on the bid side.
2
 One possibility is that these trades may have accelerated price 
discovery and contributed to the observed price declines.
3
 Deteriorating market quality also may 
have been a contributing factor, as prior research finds that liquidity and stock returns are 
positively correlated (see, for example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). However, we find that 
returns are not significantly different from zero over the same period for a closely matched 
sample of stocks that did not have cancelled trades, despite the fact that these stocks also 
experienced a negative, albeit less severe, liquidity shock around the flash crash. 
Consistent with prior studies that suggest that other sources of liquidity withdrew during the 
flash crash, we find that the fraction of trades executed on the NYSE increased significantly on 
the day of the crash. We find that bid-ask spreads increased and quote depth decreased in the 
wake of the flash crash for both the base and matched sample stocks, although the effects are 
more pronounced for stocks with cancelled trades. While it is difficult to attribute the 
deterioration in market quality directly to the flash crash, such events have the potential to 
negatively affect investor confidence, stock market participation, and liquidity. 
Contemporaneous events are also likely to have contributed to investor uncertainty during this 
period. For example, the CFTC-SEC (2010) report notes that premiums on credit default swaps 
                                                 
2
 CFTC-SEC (2010) defines stub quotes as “quotes generated by market makers (or exchanges on their behalf) at 
levels far away from the current market in order to fulfill continuous two-sided quoting obligations even when a 
market maker has withdrawn from active trading” (p. 5). According to the CFTC-SEC, of the 5.5 million shares 
traded that were ultimately cancelled, nearly two-thirds were executed at a price of less than $1.00. 
3
 Madhavan (2012) and McInish et al. (2012) also conjecture that depleted limit order books contributed to the flash 
crash.  
5 
increased for a number of European sovereign debt securities and the Euro fell in global currency 
markets on May 6, 2010. Increased investor uncertainly is also evident in the options markets. 
We find that implied volatility increased dramatically and the sensitivity of option prices to 
changes in the underlying stock prices (gamma) and implied volatility (vega) were noticeably 
different following the flash crash.  
Whereas prior studies of the flash crash tend to focus on exchange traded funds that track 
broad stock market indices, ours is one of the first to examine individual stocks impacted by the 
crash.
4
 This approach makes it possible to measure changes in shareholder wealth and the 
underlying market quality of stocks in the days surrounding the flash crash. We find that the 
shareholder wealth, market quality, and option market effects are perceptible well beyond May 6, 
2010. These effects are not only apparent for stocks that were singled out for trade cancellations 
by the exchanges, but also for matched samples that did not experience cancelled trades. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our sample and 
methodology. We report our empirical findings in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. Sample selection 
Our base sample consists of the common stocks of 29 NYSE-listed firms incorporated in the 
U.S. that had trades executed on May 6, 2010 and subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or 
NYSE Arca. Nasdaq and NYSE Arca cancelled all trades that occurred between 2:40 p.m. and 
3:00 p.m. and were executed at a price that was 60 percent higher or lower than the last trade that 
                                                 
4
 The aforementioned paper by Yu (2011) examines the impact of contrarian trading on the magnitude of individual 
stock crashes on May 6, 2010. 
6 
took place at 2:40 p.m. (or immediately prior).
5
 We match each base sample stock with a stock 
that did not have trades cancelled, using market capitalization, share price, daily turnover (shares 
traded as a percentage of shares outstanding), and return volatility (standard deviation of daily 
returns) as the basis of the match. Because of the suspected role of S&P 500 E-mini futures and 
statistical arbitrage in the flash crash, base sample stocks that are part of the S&P 500 index as of 
April 1, 2010 are matched with other S&P 500 components. Market capitalization is measured as 
of April 30, 2010, while share price, daily turnover, and return volatility are averaged over the 
period April 1, 2010 through April 30, 2010. The match for each base sample stock is the NYSE-
listed common stock that minimizes the following expression: 
   (1) 
where factori denotes the value of the i
th
 matching variable for the base sample stock and 
factori
matched
 denotes the value of the i
th
 matching variable for the matched stock. For each 
matching characteristic, i, this minimization is done subject to the constraint: 
   (2) 
We report the stocks contained in both the base and matched samples in Table 1. 
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
In Table 2 we report descriptive statistics for both samples. We report that the typical base 
sample stock has a market capitalization of over $25 billion, a share price of $40.70, daily 
                                                 
5
 NYSE Euronext did not cancel any trades executed on May 6, 2010. The lists of stocks with trades cancelled by 
Nasdaq and NYSE Arca are available through the following websites: 
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_canceled0507_20100507.html 
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_cancelednyse0507_20100507.html 
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turnover of 1.06%, and return volatility of 1.77%. Paired t-tests indicate that the means of the 
base and matched samples are not significantly different from one another for any of the four 
matching characteristics. The median values confirm the suitability of our matched sample. 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicate that the only significant difference in the medians of the base 
and matched samples is for the market capitalization measure. 
<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Abnormal returns 
We begin our analysis with an examination of stock returns around the flash crash. Our 
benchmark for measuring abnormal returns is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model 
augmented by Carhart‟s (1997) momentum factor.6 The model is: 
 jttjtjtjmtjjjt UMDuHMLhSMBsRR   , (3) 
where Rjt is the return on the j
th
 stock on day t, Rmt is the return on the market index on day t, 
SMBt is the average return on small-firm stocks minus the average return on large-firm stocks on 
day t, HMLt is the average return on high book-to-market stocks minus the average return on low 
book-to-market stocks on day t, and UMDt is the average return on high prior return portfolios 
minus the average return on low prior return portfolios. βj, sj, hj, and uj measure a stock‟s 
sensitivity to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, respectively. 
Daily abnormal returns are measured for common stock j on day t as:  
 )ˆˆˆˆˆ( tjtjtjmtjjjtjt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRAR   , (4) 
                                                 
6
 Unreported tests confirm that the event study results are robust to alternative benchmarks for measuring abnormal 
returns, including the market model and a three-factor model that excludes Carhart‟s (1997) momentum factor. 
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where ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ jjjj hs and juˆ are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates from Eq. (3). We 
estimate Eq. (3) over the 255 trading days ending at least 46 days before the flash crash and 
calculate abnormal returns for each stock with Eq. (4). 
In Table 3, we report the results of our abnormal return analysis. We report mean abnormal 
returns and the percentage of returns greater than zero for both the base and matched samples for 
the 11 trading days centered on the day of the flash crash. At the bottom of Table 3 we report 
cumulative abnormal returns over three windows beginning on the event day. On the day of the 
flash crash, the abnormal return for the typical base sample stock is –0.80 percent. Over the 
window [0, +1], the mean cumulative abnormal return is –1.77 percent. The majority of the base 
sample stocks experience non-positive abnormal returns both on the day of the flash crash (72 
percent) and over the two day window beginning on the day of the flash crash (82 percent). 
Returns for the matched sample are not significantly different from zero over the same period. 
<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
These results show that the flash crash was accompanied by a significant decline in 
shareholder wealth, particularly for stocks that subsequently had trades cancelled. The decline in 
shareholder wealth is consistent with a number of possible explanations. During the flash crash, 
several of the base sample stocks had trades execute at stub quotes (e.g., $0.01), which indicates 
that the limit order book was very thin on the bid side. One possibility is that market participants 
updated their views about these stocks‟ true value based on this information, leading to the 
observed price declines. We are not the first to propose that the limit order book played a role in 
the flash crash. For instance, Madhavan (2012) conjectures that market fragmentation 
contributed to the flash crash, in part, by thinning out limit order books. McInish et al. (2012) 
9 
find evidence that intermarket sweep orders may have destabilized the market by depleting the 
limit order book. 
Another possibility is that the price declines resulted from negative shocks to liquidity, which 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find is positively correlated with stock returns. We report 
evidence that liquidity deteriorated around the flash crash in subsequent tests. However, despite 
our finding that returns are not significantly different from zero for the matched sample, we find 
that market quality deteriorated for both samples around the flash crash. Before turning to market 
quality and the options markets, we continue with a brief look at trade execution before, during, 
and after the flash crash.  
 
3.2. Trade execution 
Whereas high frequency traders are often a significant source of liquidity in the financial 
markets, Kirilenko et al. (2011) conclude that high frequency traders‟ behavior on the day of the 
flash crash exacerbated market volatility. Consistent with this notion, the CFTC-SEC (2010) 
report on the flash crash finds evidence that some high frequency traders aggressively sold shares 
during the crash, while others scaled back or stopped trading altogether. An obvious question 
arises. Who stepped into the void left when other sources of liquidity moved to the sidelines?  
The importance of dedicated market makers has been debated for decades. Garbade and 
Silber (1979) and Grossman and Miller (1988) highlight the advantages of having a market 
maker obligated to maintain a market. More recent studies by Glosten (1994) and Bloomfield et 
al. (2005) suggest, however, that market structure is likely to evolve in favor of public liquidity 
providers. In Figs. 2a and 2b, we provide evidence that the importance of NYSE designated 
market makers increased during the flash crash.  
10 
<<FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
In Fig. 2a, we report the percentage of trades executed on the NYSE between 9:30 a.m. and 
4:00 p.m. for the 21 trading days centered on May 6, 2010. This figure shows a pronounced 
spike in the percentage of trades executed on the NYSE for both the base and matched samples 
beginning on the day of the flash crash. Both samples experience an increase in the percentage of 
trades executed on the NYSE of over 20 percent on the day of the flash crash. That is, from May 
5 to May 6, 2010 the percentage of trades executed on the NYSE increases from 23.2 percent to 
28.5 percent for the base sample and from 23.4 percent to 28.9 percent for the matched sample. 
A closer examination indicates that this shift toward the NYSE began right around the time 
of the flash crash. In Fig. 2b, we partition May 6, 2010 into 20-minute intervals and report the 
percentage of trades executed on the NYSE for both samples. Just before 1:00 p.m., 
approximately 26.6 percent (22.3 percent) of the trades in the base sample (matched sample) 
stocks were executed on the NYSE. By 2:20 p.m., this figure had increased to 28.0 percent (26.0 
percent). Remarkably, just prior to the close of the trading day, the percentage of trades executed 
on the NYSE approached 35.6 percent and 40.0 percent for the base and matched sample, 
respectively. 
In Fig. 3, we examine trading volume across different market centers, as reported by the 
Trade and Quote Database. We report, in 20-minute intervals, the percentage of total trading 
volume captured by the NASD ADF/TRF, NYSE, NYSE Arca, NASD, and BATS.
7
 Consistent 
with Fig. 2, we report a significant increase in the percentage of trading volume executed by the 
NYSE, beginning at about 2:00 p.m. The majority of this increase comes at the expense of the 
NASD ADF/TRF, where the primary sources of trades are OTC market makers and block 
                                                 
7
 We exclude venues that capture less than 5 percent of total trading volume from Figure 5. 
11 
positioners. This is consistent with the notion that OTC market makers, who typically internalize 
a large portion of the order flow, instead chose to route orders to the exchanges.  
<<FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
The dramatic increase in the number of trades executed on May 6, 2010 highlighted in Figs. 
4a and 4b, underscores the importance of the NYSE during this period of market instability. Fig. 
4a reports the number of trades executed between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. for the 21 trading days 
centered on May 6, 2010. This figure illustrates the significant spike in the number of trades 
executed on that day. Fig. 4b partitions May 6, 2010 into 20-minute intervals and shows that the 
number of trades executed began to increase rapidly just prior to the flash crash.  
<<FIG. 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
Why did the NYSE execute a larger percentage of trades during the flash crash? Prior 
studies, including Easley et al. (2011), suggest that high frequency traders, a significant source of 
liquidity in the financial markets, scaled back their trading during the flash crash. If this was 
indeed the case, the NYSE designated market makers‟ obligation to maintain a market may have 
led them to step into the void created by the absence of high frequency traders. Another 
possibility, supported by Nanex (2010) research, is that NYSE quotes lagged other markets 
during the flash crash, which allowed arbitrageurs to profit at the expense of the NYSE and 
drove trading volume to the exchange.  
In Fig. 5, we report evidence consistent with Nanex‟s (2010) contention that delays in quote 
dissemination increased seller-initiated volume on the NYSE. We use trade direction indicators 
constructed using a combination of the tick- and quote-test methodology (Lee and Ready, 1991) 
and find that the percentage of seller-initiated trades spiked on the NYSE in advance of the flash 
crash and remained at elevated levels through the end of the trading day. However, neither 
12 
explanation (high frequency traders, arbitrage trading) accounts for the sustained increase in 
trades captured by the NYSE in the days following the flash crash. Not only do we find that the 
NYSE executed a greater portion of trades during the flash crash, but also for several days 
afterwards. 
<<FIG. 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
3.3. Market quality 
In this section, we examine market quality measures for signs that liquidity deteriorated in 
the days and weeks surrounding the flash crash. The primary measure of transaction costs in the 
microstructure literature is the bid-ask spread, which refers to the difference in the prices that a 
supplier of immediacy stands ready to buy and sell a security. Demsetz (1968) suggests that the 
bid-ask spread provides compensation to dealers for providing liquidity. We calculate three 
spread-based measures that are commonly used in the literature. The first is the absolute spread, 
which is calculated as follows: 
 Absolute spread = Ait – Bit, (5) 
where Ait and Bit represent the ask and bid for security i at time t, respectively.  
The second measure is the quoted spread, which is calculated as follows: 
 Quoted spread = (Ait – Bit)/Pit x 100, (6) 
where Pit represents the trade price for security i at time t. Determinants of the quoted spread 
include order handling costs (Tinic, 1972), inventory risk (Stoll, 1978), and adverse selection 
(Copeland and Galai, 1983).  
13 
Lee (1993) finds that trades often occur at a price inside or outside the bid and ask quotes. 
The third measure, the effective spread, reflects this possibility and represents an estimate of the 
true execution cost for a trader. Following Lee, the effective spread is calculated as follows: 
 Effective spread = 2 x Sit x (Pit – Mit)/Mit x 100, (7) 
where Sit is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 (–1) for buy (sell) orders and Mit is the 
quote midpoint calculated as the average of the ask and bid prices.  
Lee et al. (1993) suggest that market makers who are subject to adverse selection can both 
increase spreads and reduce depth, where depth refers to the number of shares a market maker is 
willing to trade at the prevailing bid and ask quotes. Thus, we consider quote depth as an 
additional measure of market quality. We measure quote depth as the average depth at the 
prevailing National Best Bid and Offer bid and ask quotes.  
 Quote depth = (Depthbid + Depthask)/2, (8) 
In Table 4, we report the market quality measures for the base sample (Panel A) and matched 
sample (Panel B) from one day before through one day after the flash crash (May 5 – May 7, 
2010). In addition to the measures discussed above, we report turnover (the daily number of 
shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), volume (number of shares traded 
across all exchanges), and the percentage of trades executed on the NYSE. Because we are 
interested in market quality changes that anticipate and/or linger beyond the flash crash, we 
restrict our analysis to between 9:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to avoid contaminating the results with 
14 
potentially temporary market quality changes that occurred during the flash crash.
8
 Both panels 
report daily mean values and day-to-day differences.  
<<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
In Table 4, Panel A, we find that spreads widened and depth decreased around the flash crash 
for base sample stocks. The spread measures indicate that trading costs were significantly higher 
the day after the flash crash compared to prior days. For example, the average quoted spread for 
the base sample is over 44 percent higher on May 7, 2010 compared to the day of the flash crash 
(0.163 percent and 0.113 percent, respectively). Similar results are observed for absolute and 
effective spreads. Quote depth is dramatically lower the day after the flash crash compared to the 
day before and the day of the crash.
9
 Finally, both average turnover and volume increased 
dramatically following the flash crash and, as reported earlier, there is a marked increase in the 
percentage of trades executed on the NYSE that extended to the day after the flash crash. This 
evidence is consistent with the CFTC-SEC (2010) contention that high trading volume may not 
imply sufficient market liquidity in times of high volatility. 
In Table 4, Panel B, we report a similar deterioration in market quality for the matched 
sample. As is the case for the base sample, the matched sample stocks exhibit wider spreads and 
lower depths following the flash crash. This suggests that the market quality deterioration around 
                                                 
8
 In unreported tests, we find that bid-ask spreads spike and quote depths plummet during the 2:20 – 3:00 p.m. 
period. Spreads decline rapidly after 3:00 p.m., but remain significantly higher than before the flash crash, while 
depth remains at depressed levels through the end of the day. 
9
 In Table 4, we exclude Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and its corresponding match from the quote depth, volume, and 
turnover analysis. Radian Group Inc. executed a public offering during this period that is likely to have had a 
significant impact on these measures. 
15 
the flash crash was not limited to the stocks that had trades cancelled.
10
 In Panel C, we report 
differences between the base and matched sample for each day. Day-to-day differences in 
spreads, while not significant on the day prior to the flash crash, increase and become significant 
on the day of and the day after the flash crash. This indicates that the worsening of liquidity was 
more pronounced for stocks with cancelled trades. 
In Table 5, we report OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in spreads 
from May 5 through May 7, 2010. Base sample is an indicator variable set equal to 1 for stocks 
that had a trade executed on May 6, 2010 that was subsequently cancelled by the Nasdaq or 
NYSE Arca and zero for matched sample stocks. Additional control variables include day-to-day 
changes in intraday volatility, turnover, and price (price inverse). We also interact the indicator 
variable with each of the control variables to capture their marginal effects for base sample 
stocks.  
<<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
The first three columns of Table 5 report changes in absolute, quoted, and effective spreads, 
respectively, from May 5 to May 6, 2010 (Event / Pre-Event). The results indicate that changes 
in intraday volatility had a significant impact on absolute spreads, but only for the base sample 
stocks. Recall from Table 4 that spreads increased significantly for both the base and matched 
samples following the flash crash. The middle (last) three columns of Table 5 examine changes 
in spreads from May 6 – May 7, 2010 (May 5 – May 7, 2010). We find some evidence that the 
                                                 
10
 In unreported tests, we examine market quality changes for (i) a random control sample, (ii) a matched sample 
that excludes the S&P 500 index match criteria, and (iii) a matched sample based on March, 2010 market 
capitalization, share price, average daily turnover, and return volatility. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Tables 4-7 and support the notion that the deterioration in market quality around the flash crash extended 
beyond the stocks that had trades cancelled. 
16 
increase in quoted spreads following the crash is negatively correlated with changes in turnover, 
but this effect is concentrated in matched sample stocks.  
In Table 6, we examine market quality over a two-week period following the day of the flash 
crash (May 7 – May 20, 2010) and compare the spread and depth measures to the two-week 
period that preceded the crash (April 22 – May 5, 2010). Because we do not include May 6, we 
extend our analysis to the full trading day (9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.). We report the results for the 
base (matched) sample in Panel A (Panel B). In Panel A, we report that each of the spread 
measures were higher over the two-week period that followed the flash crash compared to the 
two weeks that preceded it. Additionally, quote depth decreased, while turnover and the 
percentage of trades executed by the NYSE increased in the wake of the flash crash. In Panel B, 
we report a similar deterioration in market quality for the matched sample. In Panel C, we find 
that the market quality measures exhibit few significant differences between the two samples 
both before and after the flash crash. 
<<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>> 
In Table 7, we report OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
absolute, quoted, and effective spreads from the two weeks before the flash crash (April 22 – 
May 5, 2010) through two weeks after the flash crash (May 7 – May 20, 2010). The control 
variables mirror those reported in Table 5, but are measured over the two weeks before and after 
the flash crash. The results suggest that the change in absolute spreads is negatively (positively) 
correlated with changes in turnover (prices). Changes in quoted and effective spreads are 
positively correlated with changes in intraday volatility around the flash crash. 
<<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>> 
17 
Overall, our analysis indicates that the deterioration in market quality around the flash crash 
extended to stocks beyond those with cancelled trades. This deterioration is observable well 
beyond May 6, 2010 as bid-ask spreads are higher and quote depth is lower in the two weeks 
following the flash crash compared to the two weeks prior to the flash crash for both the base and 
matched samples. The multivariate results suggest that trading volume (turnover) and volatility 
were primary determinants of the higher spreads. Contemporaneous events make it difficult to 
attribute the deterioration in market quality solely to the flash crash. For instance, the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe was also likely to have contributed to investor uncertainty (see, for 
example, CFTC-SEC, 2010). However, events like the flash crash have the potential to 
negatively affect investor confidence, stock market participation, and liquidity. 
 
3.4. Options markets 
The CFTC-SEC (2010) report indicates that, while the disruptions in the options markets 
were not as severe as those in the equities markets, some options market makers did respond to 
the day‟s volatility by widening quotes, reducing depth, and/or withdrawing from the market 
entirely. In Table 8, we report additional evidence on the options markets around May 6, 2010. 
We calculate implied volatility, delta, gamma, and vega using option price data from 
OptionMetrics for the 11 trading days centered on the day of the flash crash, where delta 
measures the sensitivity of an option's value to changes in the underlying stock price, gamma 
measures the sensitivity of an option's delta to changes in the stock price, and vega measures the 
sensitivity of an option's value to changes in the implied volatility. All calculations use historical 
LIBOR/Eurodollar rates for interest rate inputs, and correctly incorporate discrete dividend 
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payments. Variables are calculated using at-the-money forward call options with 30 days to 
expiration.
11
 
<<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>> 
Our analysis of the options markets supports the notion that uncertainty dramatically 
increased around the flash crash. We find that implied volatility spiked on the day of the flash 
crash. For example, for base sample stocks with tradable options, the average implied volatility 
increased from 0.360 to 0.462 from May 5 to May 6, 2010. This represents a statistically 
significant increase of 28.33 percent. We also report a less pronounced, albeit significant, 
increase in implied volatility for the matched sample. While the average delta was unchanged, 
we find that both gamma and vega changed significantly during the flash crash. The decrease in 
gamma suggests that option prices became less sensitive to changes in the underlying stock 
prices on the day of the flash crash. The increase in vega suggests that that option prices became 
more sensitive to changes in implied volatility around the flash crash. Overall, the results 
indicate that derivatives traders‟ volatility estimates increased around the flash crash.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The flash crash lasted only a short time, but it left an indelible mark on financial markets. 
The crash has already affected regulatory policy, as the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission recently approved trading pauses for individual stocks that experience a price 
movement of 10 percent or more over a five-minute period.
12
 Regulators, researchers, and other 
                                                 
11
 In unreported tests, we examine implied volatility, delta, gamma, and vega using put option data. The results 
obtained are qualitatively similar to the results reported in Table 8. 
12
 Securities and Exchange Commission Act Release no. 34-62252/ June 10, 2010. 
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market participants continue to seek explanations for the day‟s events. We contribute to the 
search for answers by studying stock returns, market quality, and options market activity around 
the flash crash. 
We find that shareholder wealth declined for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 
2010 that were subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. We find that the fraction 
of trades executed on the NYSE increased dramatically during the flash crash and that market 
quality deteriorated, as bid-ask spreads increased and quote depths decreased. We also report 
significant changes in the derivatives markets as implied volatility increased, and option values 
became less (more) sensitive to changes in the underlying stock prices (implied volatility). These 
effects were not limited to stocks with cancelled trades but are also evident for a closely matched 
sample of stocks without trade cancellations. While it is difficult to attribute all of the results that 
we document strictly to the flash crash, such events have the potential to negatively impact 
investor confidence and destabilize financial markets. 
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Fig. 1. Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF (May 6, 2010). This figure reports the price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF on May 6, 2010. The horizontal 
axis shows time during the day and the vertical axis shows the level of the index. 
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Fig. 2a. Percentage of trades executed on the New York Stock Exchange (daily). This figure reports the percentage of shares traded on NYSE to shares traded on 
all exchanges in the U.S. The solid line reports percentages for the base sample, which consists of the stocks of 29 NYSE-listed firms incorporated in the U.S. 
that had trades executed on May 6, 2010 and subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. Each base sample stock is matched with a stock that did 
not have trades cancelled on the basis of market capitalization, share price, daily turnover, and return volatility (dashed line). 
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Fig. 2b. Percentage of trades executed on the New York Stock Exchange (20 minute intervals). This figure reports the percentage of trades executed on the 
NYSE for the base sample and the matched sample on May 6, 2010, using average values over 20 minute intervals between 9:40 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.  
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Fig. 3. Percentage of trading volume by market center (20 minute intervals). This figure reports, in 20 minute intervals, the percentage of all trades executed on 
the five largest market centers (by volume) between 9:40 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on May 6, 2010.  
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Fig. 4a. Average number of trades (daily). This figure reports the average number of trades executed at all the U.S. stock exchanges for both the base sample and 
the matched sample.  
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Fig. 4b. Average number of trades (20 minute intervals). This figure reports, in 20 minute intervals, the average number of trades executed for the base sample 
and the matched sample between 9:40 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on May 6, 2010. 
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Fig. 5. Average percentage of seller-initiated trades (20 minute intervals). This figure reports, in 20 minute intervals, the percentage of all trades executed on the 
NYSE that are seller-initiated for both the base sample and the matched sample between 9:40 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on May 6, 2010. 
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Table 1 
Base sample and matched sample.   
Base sample   Matched sample 
Company Ticker 
 
Company Ticker 
3M Co. MMM 
 
McDonald‟s Corp. MCD 
American Tower Corporation AMT 
 
St. Jude Medical Inc. STJ 
Arvinmeritor Inc. ARM 
 
Frontier Oil Corporation FTO 
B&G Foods Inc. BGS 
 
Comfort Systems USA Inc. FIX 
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. BIO 
 
Kinder Morgan Management LLC KMR 
Boston Beer Co. Inc. SAM 
 
Ameron International Corp. AMN 
Brown & Brown Inc. BRO 
 
Ingram Micro Inc. IM 
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. CNP 
 
NiSource Inc. NI 
CenturyTel, Inc. CTL 
 
FirstEnergy Corp. FE 
Cenveo Inc. CVO 
 
The E. W. Scripps Company SSP 
Clearwater Paper Corporation CLW 
 
Piper Jaffray Companies PJC 
Culp Inc. CFI 
 
Kenneth Cole Productions Inc. KCP 
Eagle Materials Inc. EXP 
 
GATX Corp. GMT 
Exelon Corporation EXC 
 
Walgreen Co. WAG 
Health Net, Inc. HNT 
 
Superior Energy Services, Inc. SPN 
Hewlett-Packard Company HPQ 
 
The Coca-Cola Company KO 
ITC Holdings Corp. ITC 
 
Transatlantic Holdings Inc. TRH 
The Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. IPG 
 
PulteGroup, Inc. PHM 
Iowa Telecommunications Services Inc. IWA 
 
Empire District Electric Co. EDE 
Lear Corp. LEA 
 
SPX Corporation SPW 
Merck & Co. Inc. MRK 
 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC 
ONEOK Inc. OKE 
 
Hormel Foods Corp. HRL 
Oxford Industries Inc. OXM 
 
Trex Co. Inc. TREX 
Philip Morris International, Inc. PM 
 
Abbott Laboratories ABT 
Procter & Gamble Co. PG 
 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 
Quest Diagnostics Inc. DGX 
 
ITT Corporation ITT 
Radian Group Inc. RDN 
 
Avis Budget Group, Inc. CAR 
Sotheby‟s BID 
 
Tempur Pedic International Inc. TPX 
United Technologies Corp. UTX   Occidental Petroleum Corporation OXY 
This table reports the base sample and matched sample stocks used in this study. The base sample consists of the 
stocks of 29 NYSE-listed firms incorporated in the U.S. that had trades executed on May 6, 2010 and subsequently 
cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. Nasdaq and NYSE Arca cancelled all trades that occurred between 2:40 
p.m. and 3:00 p.m. that executed at a price that was 60 percent greater or lower than the last trade that took place at 
2:40 p.m. (or immediately prior). We match each base sample stock with a matching stock that did not have trades 
cancelled, on the basis of market capitalization, share price, daily turnover, and return volatility. Base sample stocks 
that are part of the S&P 500 index as of April 1, 2010 are matched with other S&P 500 components. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics.  
 Means  Medians 
  Base sample Matched sample Difference  Base sample Matched sample Difference 
Market capitalization   25,571.647         27,995.022  –2423.375    3,077.971    3,483.518  –141.075** 
Price 40.699 38.058 2.641  35.936 36.346 –0.567 
Turnover (%) 1.059 1.058 0.001  0.692 0.827 0.009 
Volatility (%) 1.772 1.789 –0.017  1.309 1.436 –0.033 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the base sample and matched sample stocks and differences between the samples. Market capitalization (in millions of 
U.S. dollars) is the price times the number of shares outstanding on April 30, 2010. Share price is the average closing price, turnover is the average number of 
shares traded as a percentage of shares outstanding, and return volatility is standard deviation of daily returns calculated over the period April 1, 2010 and April 
30, 2010. Significance of differences in means (medians) is assessed using paired t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 
Abnormal returns. 
 
  Base sample   Matched sample     
    Abnormal returns % positive 
 
Abnormal returns % positive 
 
Difference 
April 29 
 
0.389 
 
48.276 
  
0.277 
 
55.172 
  
0.112 
April 30 
 
0.152 
 
62.070 
  
1.018* 
 
65.517 
  
–0.866 
May 3 
 
0.253 
 
55.172 
  
–0.432 
 
44.828 
  
0.685 
May 4 
 
0.144 
 
58.621 
  
0.137 
 
55.172 
  
0.007 
May 5 
 
–0.006 
 
51.724 
  
–0.502 
 
51.724 
  
0.500 
May 6 
 
–0.796* 
 
27.586** 
  
–0.059 
 
37.931 
  
–0.736* 
May 7 
 
–0.974* 
 
37.931 
  
0.200 
 
55.172 
  
–1.133* 
May 10 
 
0.529 
 
58.621 
  
–0.731* 
 
31.034* 
  
1.260 
May 11 
 
–0.289 
 
51.724 
  
–0.428 
 
37.931 
  
0.139 
May 12 
 
–0.044 
 
48.276 
  
0.175 
 
37.931 
  
–0.219 
May 13 
 
0.296 
 
65.510 
  
–0.049 
 
41.379 
  
0.345 
             CAR 
            [0, +5] 
 
–1.276* 
 
34.483 
  
–0.930 
 
41.379 
  
–0.344* 
[0, +3] 
 
–1.529** 
 
27.586** 
  
–1.060 
 
41.379 
  
–0.471* 
[0, +1]   –1.769***   17.241***     0.100   55.172     –1.869*** 
This table reports mean abnormal returns, calculated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model augmented by Carhart‟s (1997) momentum factor, for the 
stocks in base sample and the matched sample for the 11-trading days centered on May 6, 2010. % positive represents the fraction of returns that are greater than 
zero. The significance of the fraction of positive returns is assessed using a sign test. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are also reported for 6-, 4-, and 2-day 
windows beginning on May 6, 2010. Difference represents the difference in average returns between the base sample and the matched sample. Significance of 
the abnormal return is assessed using a t-test and the difference in means is assessed using a paired t-test. 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Market quality measures (daily). 
 
Panel A: Base sample 
 Date Difference 
 
5-May 6-May 7-May Event-Pre Post-event Post-Pre 
Absolute spread 0.040 0.041 0.056 0.001 0.015** 0.016*** 
Quoted spread 0.116 0.113 0.163 –0.003 0.050*** 0.047*** 
Effective spread 0.096 0.089 0.128 –0.007 0.039*** 0.032*** 
Quote depth 1790.900 1655.360 948.837 –135.540 –706.523*** –842.064** 
Turnover (%) 0.790 1.014 1.115 0.224* 0.101 0.325*** 
Volume    2,458,415      2,975,994      4,212,689      517,579  1,236,695***  1,754,274**  
Trades executed on NYSE (%) 22.897 25.137 30.434 2.240** 5.297*** 7.537*** 
 
Panel B: Matched sample 
 Date Difference 
 5-May 6-May 7-May Event-Pre Post-event Post-Pre 
Absolute spread 0.034 0.028 0.041 –0.005*** 0.012*** 0.007** 
Quoted spread 0.114 0.096 0.139 –0.018** 0.043*** 0.026*** 
Effective spread 0.099 0.073 0.111 –0.026*** 0.037*** 0.011** 
Quote depth 1460.700 1607.590 868.091 146.889* –739.498*** –592.609*** 
Turnover (%) 0.807 0.780 1.059 –0.026 0.278*** 0.252** 
Volume     3,380,985      3,482,925      4,966,421      101,940  1,483,496***  1,585,436*** 
Trades executed on NYSE (%) 23.806 23.573 31.716 –0.233 8.143*** 7.910*** 
 
Panel C: Base sample – Matched sample 
 Date  
 5-May 6-May 7-May  
Absolute spread 0.006 0.013** 0.015  
Quoted spread 0.002 0.017* 0.023*  
Effective spread –0.003 0.016** 0.018*  
Quote depth 330.201 47.769 80.746  
Turnover (%) –0.016 0.234 0.056  
Volume     –922,570      –506,930      –753,732  
Trades executed on NYSE (%) –0.909 1.564 –1.282  
33 
This table reports market quality measures for the base sample and matched sample stocks on a daily basis May 5 (Pre), 6 (Event) and 7 (Post) of 2010. Panel A 
(B) reports this data for the stocks in the base sample (matched sample). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread 
is the difference between bid and ask price (ask price – bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x Sit x 
(Pit – Mit)/Mit x 100; where Sit is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and –1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test 
and quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and Mit is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by 
two. Quote depth represents the average depth at the prevailing National Best Bid and Offer bid and ask quotes. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded 
divided by the number of shares outstanding (in percent). Volume measures average trading volume across all exchanges. Trades executed on the NYSE is the 
average number of trades executed on the NYSE relative to the number of trades executed on all U.S exchanges (in percent). Differences between corresponding 
days are also reported. Panel C reports the difference in the corresponding measures between the base sample and the matched sample for each day. Significance 
of difference in values is assessed using paired t-test. 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 
Change in spreads (daily). 
 
Event / Pre-Event Post-Event / Event Post-Event / Pre-Event 
 
∆ Absolute 
spread 
∆ Quoted  
spread 
∆ Effective 
spread 
∆ Absolute 
spread 
∆ Quoted  
spread 
∆ Effective 
spread 
∆ Absolute 
spread 
∆ Quoted  
spread 
∆ Effective 
spread 
Base sample 0.003 0.006 0.006 –0.012 –0.027 –0.023 0.006 0.025 0.019 
 
(0.59) (0.59) (0.65) (–0.81) (–0.73) (–0.96) (0.59) (1.07) (1.31) 
∆ Intraday volatility 0.001 0.012 0.038 –0.024 –0.003 0.012 –0.007 –0.003 0.017 
 
(0.12) (0.35) (1.43) (–1.10) (–0.05) (0.30) (–1.13) (–0.13) (0.79) 
∆ Turnover –0.005 0.002 –0.002 –0.008 –0.082* –0.048 0.001 0.002 0.007 
 
(–0.88) (0.07) (–0.17) (–1.14) (–1.81) (–1.63) (0.25) (0.08) (0.57) 
∆ Inverse price –0.004 –0.055 –0.053 0.003 0.068 0.042 –0.006 0.030 0.013 
 
(–0.63) (–1.48) (–1.45) (0.16) (1.00) (1.05) (–1.05) (0.88) (0.63) 
Base x ∆ Intraday volatility 0.063* 0.087 0.054 0.038 –0.011 0.002 0.022 0.001 0.002 
 
(1.94) (1.35) (0.94) (1.36) (–0.14) (0.03) (1.44) (0.01) (0.07) 
Base x ∆ Turnover 0.006 –0.001 0.003 0.008 0.084* 0.049 –0.001 –0.012 –0.014 
 
(0.89) (–0.04) (0.18) (1.20) (1.84) (1.65) (–0.23) (–0.59) (–1.05) 
Base x ∆ Inverse price 0.004 0.018 0.036 –0.015 0.080 0.055 –0.013 0.001 0.007 
 
(0.35) (0.42) (0.80) (–0.47) (0.82) (0.93) (–1.17) (0.02) (0.23) 
Intercept –0.005 –0.007 –0.013** 0.024* 0.060* 0.041* 0.011** 0.018 0.001 
 
(–1.48) (–0.85) (–2.09) (1.94) (1.84) (2.00) (2.17) (1.66) (0.15) 
 
         
Number of observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R
2
 0.328 0.333 0.382 0.048 0.218 0.218 0.108 0.106 0.182 
This table reports OLS regressions of changes in spreads for the base sample and matched sample stocks from May 5 to May 6, 2010 (Event / Pre-Event), May 6 
to May 7, 2010 (Post-Event / Event), and May 5 to May 7, 2010 (Post-Event / Pre-Event). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a 
stock. Quoted spread is the difference between bid and ask price (ask price – bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is 
calculated as 2 x Sit x (Pit – Mit)/Mit x 100; where Sit is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and –1 for sell orders, constructed using a 
combination of the tick-test and quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and Mit is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus 
the bid price, divided by two. Base sample is an indicator set equal to 1 for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled 
by the Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and zero for matched sample stocks. Intraday volatility is the standard deviation of open-to-close mid-quote returns, measured over 
20-minute intervals. Turnover is the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. Inverse price is the ratio of 1 to the stock price. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 6 
Market quality measures (two-week intervals). 
 
Panel A: Base sample 
  Mean   Median 
  May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5 Difference 
 
May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5 Difference 
Absolute spread 0.039 0.034 0.005** 
 
0.019 0.015 0.002*** 
Quoted spread 0.111 0.093 0.018*** 
 
0.073 0.063 0.012*** 
Effective spread 0.086 0.072 0.014*** 
 
0.069 0.054 0.008*** 
Quote depth 2585.300 3314.150 –728.850*** 
 
926.327 1570.380 –399.245*** 
Turnover (%) 1.541 1.226 0.315*  0.917 0.762 0.156** 
Volume   4,466,742   3,846,983     619,759       1,812,562      1,632,800         57,741**  
Trades executed on NYSE (%) 27.462 24.631 2.831***   27.647 25.574 1.207*** 
 
Panel B: Matched sample 
  Mean   Median 
  May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5 Difference 
 
May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5 Difference 
Absolute spread 0.029 0.026 0.003** 
 
0.019 0.017 0.001*** 
Quoted spread 0.098 0.086 0.012*** 
 
0.068 0.060 0.006*** 
Effective spread 0.075 0.067 0.009*** 
 
0.055 0.051 0.005*** 
Quote depth 2205.890 2935.280 –729.390*** 
 
709.969 942.272 –214.681*** 
Turnover (%) 1.192 1.242 –0.050  0.910 0.854 0.107 
Volume   5,168,037   4,489,347     678,689       1,912,411      1,782,376        54,663  
Trades executed on NYSE (%) 26.978 24.719 2.258***   27.474 26.441 2.185*** 
 
Panel C: Base sample – Matched sample 
 Mean  Median 
 May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5  May 7 – May 20 April 22 – May 5 
Absolute spread 0.010** 0.008  0.001 0.000 
Quoted spread 0.013 0.007  0.004* 0.000 
Effective spread 0.010 0.005  0.005** 0.002 
Quote depth 379.410 378.870  32.442 –36.947 
Turnover (%) 0.348 –0.016  –0.022 –0.015 
Volume    –701,294   –642,364        –20,136            –87,954* 
Trades executed on NYSE (%) 0.485 –0.089  –0.536 1.273 
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This table reports the mean and median daily average market quality measures over two week intervals (a) preceding the flash crash (April 22 – May 5) and (b) 
following the flash crash (May 7 – May 20). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread is the difference between bid 
and ask price (ask price – bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x S it x (Pit – Mit)/Mit x 100; where 
Sit is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and –1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test and quote-test 
methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and Mit is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by two. Quote depth 
represents the average depth at the prevailing National Best Bid and Offer bid and ask quotes. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding (in percent). Volume measures average trading volume across all exchanges. Trades executed on the NYSE is the average number 
of trades executed on the NYSE relative to the number of trades executed on all U.S exchanges (in percent). Difference represents the mean difference over the 
May 7 – May 20 period and the April 22 – May 5 period. The median difference is also reported. Panel A (B) reports the results for the base sample (matched 
sample). Panel C shows the mean and the median difference between the base sample and the matched sample over the corresponding time periods. Significance 
of difference in values of means (medians) is assessed using paired t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7 
Change in spreads (two-week intervals). 
 
∆ Absolute  
spread 
∆ Quoted  
spread 
∆ Effective  
spread 
Base sample 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 
(1.41) (0.64) (0.73) 
∆ Intraday volatility 0.039 0.090* 0.054* 
 
(1.55) (1.91) (1.93) 
∆ Turnover –0.004* –0.004 0.001 
 
(–1.91) (–0.69) (0.39) 
∆ Inverse price –0.008** –0.000 0.005 
 
(–2.21) (–0.03) (0.90) 
Base x ∆ Intraday volatility –0.034 –0.019 –0.008 
 
(–1.09) (–0.27) (–0.17) 
Base x ∆ Turnover 0.005 0.001 –0.002 
 
(1.40) (0.15) (–0.29) 
Base x ∆ Inverse price 0.004 0.002 –0.001 
 
(0.82) (0.14) (–0.06) 
Intercept 0.002* 0.004 0.002* 
 
(1.72) (1.55) (1.98) 
    Number of observations 58 58 58 
R
2
 0.104 0.142 0.229 
This table reports OLS regressions of changes in spreads for the base sample and matched sample from the two weeks preceding the flash crash (April 22 – May 
5) through two weeks following the flash crash (May 7 – May 20). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread is the 
difference between bid and ask price (ask price – bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x Sit x (Pit – 
Mit)/Mit x 100; where Sit is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and –1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test and 
quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and Mit is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by two. 
Base sample is an indicator set equal to 1 for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled by the Nasdaq or NYSE Arca 
and zero for matched sample stocks. Intraday volatility is the standard deviation of open-to-close mid-quote returns, measured over 20-minute intervals. Turnover 
is the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. Inverse price is the ratio of 1 to the stock price. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Options markets.  
  Base sample   Matched sample 
 
Implied 
Volatility Delta Gamma Vega 
 
Implied 
Volatility Delta Gamma Vega 
April 29 0.311 0.528 0.193 8.483 
 
0.314 0.532 0.174 7.304 
April 30 0.353 0.527 0.159 9.176 
 
0.331 0.531 0.164 7.809 
May 3 0.322 0.527 0.184 8.862 
 
0.308 0.533 0.182 7.515 
May 4 0.347 0.526 0.174 9.250 
 
0.343 0.531 0.164 8.085 
May 5 0.360 0.527 0.171 9.460 
 
0.360 0.529 0.152 8.327 
May 6 0.462 0.528 0.120 10.766 
 
0.415 0.530 0.137 9.247 
May 7 0.458 0.529 0.131 10.563 
 
0.449 0.531 0.128 9.936 
May 10 0.368 0.527 0.156 9.429 
 
0.376 0.528 0.148 8.592 
May 11 0.381 0.527 0.164 9.640 
 
0.380 0.529 0.145 8.749 
May 12 0.355 0.529 0.156 9.087 
 
0.338 0.532 0.165 8.118 
May 13 0.362 0.528 0.158 9.370 
 
0.359 0.534 0.161 8.572 
          Difference 
         [–1,0] 0.102*** 0.001 –0.051* 1.306*** 
 
0.056*** 0.001 –0.015*** 0.920*** 
[–1,1] 0.098** 0.002 –0.040** 1.103*** 
 
0.090*** 0.002 –0.023*** 1.609*** 
[–3,3] 0.059*** 0.000 –0.020* 0.778*** 
 
0.072*** –0.003 –0.038*** 1.234*** 
          Base – 
Matched 
         [–1,0] 0.046 0.000 –0.036 0.386 
     [–1,1] 0.008 –0.001 –0.017 –0.506 
     [–3,3] –0.013 0.004 0.018 –0.456           
This table reports the option related measures for the base and matched sample stocks with tradable options. All calculations use historical LIBOR/Eurodollar 
rates for interest rate inputs, and correctly incorporate discrete dividend payments. Variables are calculated using at-the-money forward call options with 30 days 
to expiration. We report the implied volatility, delta, gamma and vega on a daily basis for the 11-trading days centered on May 6, 2010. Difference denotes the 
change in the measure in a trading window. For example, [–1,0] represents the change from day –1 to day 0. Base–Matched denotes the difference in the 
respective measure between the base sample and the matched sample. Significance of the difference is assessed using a t-test. Significance of Base-Matched is 
assessed using a paired t-test.  
*      
Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**    
Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***  
Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
